Tag Archives: Premier league


Arsenal punished as midfield abandons Wenger again

After Arsenal’s bitter loss to Swansea, Arsène Wenger stood in front of a reporter and berated his team’s midfielders for conceding possession too easily and for lack of defensive awareness. It was the third time this week that Wenger spoke about the defensive duties of his midfielders going so far as to name Aaron Ramsey before and after the Anderlecht debacle. You would think that Wenger’s public proclamations and change in game plan would shore up the Arsenal defense. It didn’t.

“I thought we lost some decisive challenges in the middle of the park in the last 20 minutes and we paid for that costly and that’s where we lost the battle.”

Arsenal’s midfielders followed the new plan in the first half against Swansea. It was a bit of a dire affair, but Arsenal looked good value not to concede a goal with Ramsey and Flamini patrolling midfield, making tackles and interceptions, and with Ox helping out Calum Chambers down the right.

But in the second half — after Arsenal took the lead 1-0 off some wonderful interplay between Ox, Welbeck, and Alexis — Ramsey and Flamini both abandoned post and Arsenal were almost immediately punished. A few minutes after the first goal Arsenal were struck again, this time from a great assist by a player who had been torching Arsenal’s right back all night — a right back who deserved help. Help which never came.

Wenger criticized the first goal saying that Arsenal probably should have done better to keep the ball and could have (fouled or) won it back earlier, thus preventing the goal all together. I watched the highlights and sure enough, the old man is exactly right.

Here’s the setup image: top of the screen, Calum Chambers standing in advance of the Arsenal forwards, forming a line across the top of the screen with him are Ox, Alexis, and Welbeck – in acres of empty space. In the little triangle is Cazorla (back to goal), Ramsey, and Flamini. Score is 1-0 to the Arsenal and there are seven Arsenal players forward, and the balance of the team with Barrow in tons of space is all wrong.

Cazorla then loses possession* but Ramsey picks the ball up between Ki and Sigurdsson.

Cazorla (640x363)

Ramsey is in jail here. He probably could have made a pass to Alexis or Ox (the two players on his right) but the position of Barrow prevents him from exploiting the space Welbeck is in. Flamini senses that he is out of position, way too far forward and takes a step back.

Ramsey (640x361)

Sigurdsson makes a tackle and dispossesses Ramsey. Note the position of Flamini. He is going back and forth toward the ball like an accordion. At this moment, the wrong moment, he decides to attack the ball.

Sigggurd (640x362)

Sigurdsson passes over to Barrow and now both of Arsenal’s “defensive midfielders” are so far out of position that they look like a book on the wrong shelf, of the wrong library.

If you look at what Barrow sees, he’s got a sea of green in front of him, Gibbs is ball watching, Bony is straight ahead of him and Montero is already streaking down the space which should have been occupied by Calum Chambers. Note all the players who are standing and watching. This is a still but the video is even more damning. Four players want to be spoon-fed the ball.

But the naivete here is that Arsenal are 1-0 up and they have conceded the entire pitch to Swansea’s two fastest players. What are Ramsey and Flamini doing all the way up here with the score the way it is?

Walking (640x358)

Meanwhile, Gibbs has a moment to think, starts to advance toward the ball, and changes his mind.

fast break (640x358)

Now, Barrow is off like a greyhound. Leaving both defensive midfielders in the dust and forcing Gibbs to cover from left back. Note the position of Montero at the top right of the screen. Barrow could have passed the ball to him and he would have had an easy 1v1 with Per Mertesacker. I venture to say that Montero would have eaten Per Mertesacker alive.

Gibbs (640x362)

Gibbs was in position to make the tackle but his hesitation allows Barrow to run past him. Now Gibbs is playing catch-up. Again, Barrow could have played in Bony or Montero at this point. Look at the space that Monreal and Mertesacker have to cover. Where is the defensive midfielder? Monreal is fucked here too, he’s got Bony on him and can’t attack the ball, though I do wonder if he should have.Monreal (640x361)

Note the distance Barrow covered from that last photo to here. It took Gibbs 20+ yards to foul Barrow. foul (640x361)

Sigurdsson gets the benefit of another 2-3 yards on the ball placement. But he does strike it wonderfully for the goal.
Sczcesny-middle (640x361)

This entire sequence illustrates what’s wrong with the Arsenal system. People are complaining that Arsenal keep turning the ball over as if that’s what’s hurting Arsenal. But turning the ball over in their final third shouldn’t lead to a goal scoring opportunity because normally a team wouldn’t have both of their holding midfielders and one of their fullbacks in such an advanced position. I have to think that if Flamini held, you know… like a holding midfielder, that counter attack is broken up. Or if the turnover happened between Cazorla and Ox with Ramsey and Flamini back providing some cover, that goal never happens. But as it turns out, Arsenal’s two defensive mids were too far up the pitch, searching for the second goal when they should have been playing more simply.

I don’t know what’s going on at Arsenal. I have no inside information. I do know that Flamini and Ramsey were way too far up the pitch. I know that Wenger told Ramsey to play the defensive role more prior to the Anderlecht debacle, after the Anderlecht debacle, and now has said something similar after losing 2-1 to Swansea.

The weird thing is that Ramsey and Flamini did play more defensively in the first half, meaning that they listened at least a little. But in the second half, after Arsenal were up 1-0, they went rogue and Arsenal were punished.

As much as I want to blame Wenger for this loss I have to wonder if the real problem is that certain players just aren’t listening to him any more. After the match, while decrying the midfielders Wenger looked a harrowed man. He looked like a man who had once again put his faith in a player, like he had done with Cesc and van Persie before, and had that player abuse that faith.


*Incidentally, this counted as one of his “successful passes”

Man at the match; Chary: beware, Tigers poop on pitch

A stoppage time equaliser from Danny Welbeck changed an embarrassing result into a disappointing one as Assem Allam’s Tigers looked on course to snatch three undeserved points from Ashburton Grove.

Before I proceed further I will stress that what I say about the game is from a very tribal, Arsenal-centric point of view so if anyone has stumbled upon this report expecting an objective, balanced view, I politely suggest they “do one” (i.e. go elsewhere).

The overriding impression of Allam’s Tigers is of a team who waste time from five minutes into the game and then feign injury to halt opposition attacks. These tactics, combined with a pliant accomplice in the referee and a weakness in Arsenal’s defensive mind set led to two points being dropped when all three were needed.

We faced our FA Cup final victims for the first time since that epoch ending day in May on a mild October afternoon which whilst grey was far from as autumnal as you would expect and there seemed a closeness and humidity that seemed to stifle the air.

We went to Wembley, Wember-ly

We went to Wembley, Wember-ly

The Arsenal lined up as expected at the back with Bellerin replacing Chambers (suspended) who would have replaced Debuchy (injured) at right back and Monreal reprising his Emirates Cup role as centre back.

The midfield also picked itself as the fully fit players started( Wilshere, Flamini and Santi) with the three up top also being the only match fit/in form players, Welbeck, Alexis and The Ox. Arteta and Rosicky were on the bench as expected after their injury doubts but Rambo’s presence on the bench was a fillip as we’ve missed his dynamism when he is on form.

Early chants of

“Who are you ?”

from the HC Tigers fans were answered by:

“2 nil and you effed it up”

in a happy reference to our previous meeting.

An early shot from Santi, attacking the North Bank unusually in the first half, seemed sure to swerve into the top right hand corner but the first goalkeeper used by Ex Man United player coach Steven Bruce managed to palm the shot away.

The next significant action was early reward for a typically energetic and scintillating start to the game by Alexis, who controlled a high ball delivered and larruped a low drive to open the scoring.

Our free scoring Chilean

Our free scoring Chilean

Before the goal, and as noted earlier, Harper in goal for the Tigers was beginning the ritual of time wasting by approaching his goal kicks as if they were ticking bombs to be defused. Sadly the referee for the day marked his card by failing to stamp down on this gamesmanship by his inaction and as the game wore on more and more ludicrous lengths were went to in order to slow Arsenal’s attacks.

After the Alexis strike, surprise surprise, somehow the goal kicks were then taken quickly. Well, well !

It was a result of this that my main worry before the game, of our defence lacking the cohesion of a well-drilled back four that had played together regularly, came to fruition.

A foray down our left flank went virtually unchallenged and the Tigers first attack was rewarded by a goal – first shot, one goal, an infuriating characteristic of Arsenal sides for longer than I care to remember.

Top tier view

Top tier view

Even in the less rowdy upper tier I was in for the game there was fury about the validity of the goal as, after later enquiry, there seemed to be a foul on Flamini in the build up but what compounded this was the Arsenal defenders pausing to protest rather than playing to the whistle.

First test and the defence implode and a cheap equaliser conceded, albeit potentially wrongly allowed due to the foul. We just know that had it been us who’d fouled in the build up to the goal the lino would have gleefully flagged it as such and had it chalked off. Maybe it’s my Arsenal-centric view but it does feel we suffer disproportionately more than average from poor decisions.

Thankfully, the crowd still got behind the team from the restart and the half time jeering was directed at the referee.

The restart was calamitous as the defence and midfield showed a somnambulistic approach to dealing with Allam’s Tigers attack from the whistle. A dreamy, casual attitude in the midfield carried over to the defence as a cross came over from Arsenals left, again, and unfortunately the BFG’s leap was mistimed and allowed Hernandez to nod in to put Arsenal 2-1 down.

It seemed odd to me that I would be more worried about attacks down our right due to Bellerin’s inexperience and yet both goals conceded were from our left. It must be said that young Hector’s performance, his tenacity in the tackle and his good understanding of building an attack, got him many approving cheers all afternoon.

Now the Tiger’s were in front we got the “pooping on the pitch” my report is described as the time wasting went up another level and the tactic of “dying swans in the penalty area” was in full view.

As the Arsenal pushed forward, any chance possible one of the opposition defenders would hurl themselves to the ground and lay on the pitch, and then not move off the playing area as the referee should have ordered them too.

Dawson in particular, as you would expect from an ex-spudd, was guilty of this and when he was eventually made to walk off the pitch for treatment instead of taking the shortest route to the touchline he would take a long lazy arc across the pitch to maximise his meander to the more distant point on the touch line. All this was allowed to happen by the referee (even though Welbeck and Jack were pointing at the nearest touchline for Dawson to go to) who was beginning to lose control of the game.

And the Allam Tigers fans had the shamelessness to shout:

“Same old Arsenal, always cheating”

Their team were taking cheating and gamesmanship to a level only possible by the truly snide.

They were also keeping up their Cup Final habit of advancing six-ten yards further up the pitch on their throw ins and free kicks, but the Arsenal players seemed drilled on this part of the opposition play as they were quick to point out the encroachment and even the incompetent referee of the day had to act on that.

Second half pressure

Second half pressure

For the last twenty minutes the pattern of Arsenal attack-Tigers play acting-Arsenal chance continued into stoppage time of six minutes. The two bright spots in the Arsenal forward play, Alexis and Santi (who was his usual busy, creative/scuttling self, although a bit unlucky when it came to developing attacks) continued to put the opposition under pressure.

The introduction of Joel Campbell seemed to offer something different in our attacks and in the limited time available to him, gave a good account of himself. He seemed to be a bit of a provider/link-up player and not just the target man I thought he was.

Finally the Arsenal equalised when a clever bit of interplay between Alexis and Welbeck resulted in an equaliser that prevented the Arsenal faithful from suffering the hammer blow of a home defeat.

The reaction at the end of the match was muted relief with a tinge of exasperation as to why we allowed ourselves to get into a position where we have to claw back a late equaliser and also at a very late chance not quite going in for Gibbs when it looked like a repeat of the FA Cup Final result was about to happen.

If any satisfaction could be had from the game it was that Allam’s Tigers fans were minutes away from a famous win and that it was taken away from them. For the ethos of their play, and let’s be fair about it, they deserved nothing at all.

There did seem to be murmurs of discontent brewing in the feeling around the grounds after the game, not just with the performance but the squad deficiencies, and it will take a string of good displays to dispel these.

It is now down to the players, manager and club to do that in the coming games.


By ChärybdÏß1966 (on Twitter @charybdis1966)


Aston Villa v. Arsenal: tactical preview

By Naveen Maliakkal

Aston Villa’s 4-5-1

While Paul Lambert has experimented with various strategies, tactics, and formations during his time as the manager of Aston Villa, I believe that the approach he employed away to Liverpool represents his most probable approach for Saturday’s match.

Against Liverpool, Aston Villa set up in a 4-5-1-0 with the intention of frustrating Liverpool and looking to hit them on the counter-attack. Aston Villa looked to force Liverpool into possession and defended in their own half so to eliminate Liverpool’s greatest assets —their pace on the counter— this allows Villa to quickly allocate attacking resources into advantageous positions, often in situations that lead to 1-on-1 matchups, which simplify the dynamic resource allocation problem. It also forced Liverpool to become a possession-based side. With their poor ball circulation, poor player positioning and movement, and some of their players’ desire to settle for speculative shots from distance (cough *Gerrard* cough), Liverpool struggle to solve even these more complex dynamic resource allocation problems in possession. Without Daniel Sturridge available and with Raheem Sterling on the bench, Liverpool could not rely on the individual brilliance of their superstars to break Aston Villa’s defense.

Liverpool’s ineptitude against deep-defending sides, combined with their willingness to push both of their fullbacks forward, helped Aston Villa maximize the effectiveness of their limited attacking resources, as they could create a 1-on-1 for Gabby Agbonlahor against one of Liverpool’s center backs, with plenty of space into which he could run, often looking to drag his marker into a wide area. This allowed one of his teammates to exploit the space the center back vacated. While they did not score from open play, they scored from a set piece¹, they certainly had the right game plan for this match.

Specifically, what makes Aston Villa interesting is that they completely ignored Liverpool’s center backs when Liverpool had possession. With the likes of Mamadou Sakho and Dejan Lovren at center back, Villa had no reason to fear giving Liverpool time and space at the back. Without a true playmaking center back, all the center backs accomplished in possession was to slow down the tempo and ruin any attacking rhythm Liverpool had. This is why a player like Gerard Pique, Leonardo Bonucci, Mats Hummels, or David Luiz is so valuable for a possession-based side, as it reduces the opponent’s incentive to concentrate its defensive resources in areas closer to their goal, helping to open up space for the rest of the team.

Aston Villa’s lack of fear of Sakho and Lovren allowed them to use Gabby Agbonlahor as a man marker against Steven Gerrard. While no one would confuse Steven Gerrard with Andrea Pirlo, Liverpool do rely on his forward passing, especially if a midfielder like Phillipe Coutinho stays high up the pitch instead of switching positions with Gerrard. Agbonlahor’s tight marking, combined with Gerrard’s lack of mobility and close control, forced the Liverpool captain to make plenty of passes back to his center backs or to Jordan Henderson, slowing Liverpool’s play and allocating the ball to less dangerous players.

Behind Agbonlahor, Tom Cleverly (who seems at his best in a reactive side) and Fabian Delph looked to press Liverpool’s midfielders, turn them over, and often looked to play the ball long, either to a winger running into the space behind one of the fullbacks or to Agbonlahor making a center-to-wide run from his withdrawn position (withdrawn for a center forward). With three Aston Villa players (the two midfielders and Agbonlahor) defending the midfield base pair of Gerrard and Henderson, Villa could cut off the supply into the attacking front. With Villa’s wingers tracking Liverpool’s fullbacks and Aston Villa’s fullbacks playing narrowly to help Ashley Westwood defend the space in between the midfield and the back line, Villa had everything in place to contain Liverpool.

Midfield Rotation

What Liverpool failed to do in that match was rotate in midfield (swap positions and roles among their midfielders) which would have allowed them to punish Gabby Agbonlahor’s man marking of Steven Gerrard. Had Gerrard looked to move up the pitch and Coutinho dropped deep, Gerrard may have dragged Aston Villa’s center forward with him, reducing Villa’s potency on the counter by forcing a misallocation of resources. If Agbonlahor decided to mark the space instead of the man, then Gerrard can potentially find some freedom, with Coutinho occupying Agbonlahor’s zone, allowing him to dictate the play from a different area on the pitch.

While Arsenal do not rely on either Mikel Arteta or Mathieu Flamini as a playmaker, rotation in midfield could at the very least make Agbonlahor’s defensive task much more difficult. As a center forward, he probably does not have the experience or the ability to solve difficult resource allocation problems with respect to the defensive side of the game. By rotating, they can help to reduce the pressure on their midfield, as it may reduce Agbonlahor’s zeal in closing down an Arsenal midfielder as he may have left a space open for another. The best result for Arsenal may be that midfield rotation pulls Agbonlahor further away from goal, especially if they want to push both fullbacks up the pitch.

Keep Men Back or Press: Choose at Least One

Arsenal have gotten quite a bit of heat for pushing both of their fullbacks high up the pitch. With Arsenal often looking to keep their attackers somewhat close, to facilitate quicker ball movement in the final third (the farther apart the players are the farther passes have to travel to get to them). This puts an onus on the fullbacks to provide wide outlets, which prevents the opponent from concentrating their defensive resources on defending the center of the pitch by narrowing their back line. So there is value in having one’s fullbacks high up the pitch. The question, as always, is whether that value is worth the cost.

With the likes of Per Mertesacker and Mikel Arteta comprising a 2+1 defensive unit at the back with Laurent Koscielny, it does not seem ideal to leave either on an island. Neither looks comfortable defending in wide areas nor are they elite 1-on-1 defenders. With all that space to play the ball into, the value of Metresacker’s or Arteta’s ability to read the game, anticipate the pass, and intercept it or make a challenge decreases, as the pass they anticipate can be played far enough away that they cannot cover the space in time. In this case, keeping at least one of the fullbacks deep seems like a sensible way to decrease the amount of space to play the ball into. Even 2010-11 Barcelona, a team with the marauding Dani Alves on the right, often played Eric Abidal on the left, as a sitting fullback, forming a back three behind Sergio Busquets. Against a side like Aston Villa, who lack pinpoint passers, but have plenty of players who can run into space and win speed or strength battles, keeping a fullback deep could go a long way in helping Arsenal win this game, either by limiting the effectiveness of the few resources Aston Villa look to deploy in attack or by forcing them to shift resources from defending toward attacking. One can always look to create width with the forward line instead.

However, what Arsenal should probably implement is some system of counter-pressing, regardless of whether they want to keep a fullback deep. It seems like the most important moments in a football match are the moments once a side loses possession, and Arsenal tend to have this maddening passivity with the way they defend their opponent’s transitions. This passivity, combined with pushing up both fullbacks, leaves Arsenal rather easy to play through, allowing their opponent to create 1-on-1 matchups or run into acres of space behind the fullback. Counter-pressing allows Arsenal to better defend the transition.

Now, to be clear, counter-pressing is a specific type of pressing, used to win possession back after it has been lost. Counter-pressing allows a team like Arsenal to win possession back quickly after it is lost, allows them to win the ball back in advantageous positions (positions closer to goal and/or with an opponent who has broken their defensive structure to counter-attack) making it a potent creator of goal-scoring opportunities, and helps a team maintain control of the match without possession.

There are different flavors of counter-pressing that can involve swarming the ball carrier, like 1970s Ajax or the 1974 Dutch side, though this may be problematic as it can lead to open passing lanes (very good idea if you wish to target someone who is utterly inept on the ball).

If you have a super holding midfielder who is a master of the intercepting foot², then a team may look to extract value from that skill by pressing the ball carrier, closing down some of the passing lanes, and leaving other passing lanes open. These “safe” passing lanes give the ball carrier an “out” but unless the pass is well hit (hard to do under pressure), the holding midfielder can anticipate, intercept, and launch the team forward. This is why the holding midfielder often has to be the player with the most intelligence, technical ability, vision, and understanding of the entire shape of the play. A player who cannot read the game, anticipate the pass, and understand the best path to the ball fails too often at making the interception, making it too easy to play through this kind of counter-pressing. A player without technical ability, vision, and an understanding of team shape cannot make that quick pass to open up the opposition, making the transition too slow, giving the opponent more of a chance to allocate their defensive resources properly.

If you have the athleticism and fitness to pull it off, along with a lack of a super-duper holding midfielder, a team may opt for a swarming counter-press, where multiple players look to converge on the ball carrier. These pressers will take routes to the ball that eliminate many passing lanes, and often look to leave any open spaces or passing lanes in wide areas. If a pass is made into the wide area, the pressers move to swarm the new man on the ball, using the sideline as an extra defender, while the rest of the team shifts ball-side. So even if the team cannot win the ball back initially, they set themselves up to pin their opponent to the sideline and tighten the vice.

If a team lacks the athleticism to commit defensive resources high up the pitch consistently or has a general risk-aversion (failure in the previous three types can lead to a lot of open space to exploit), but has the physicality and tackling ability to make life tough for their opponent, then maybe you opt to send a man at the ball-carrier (or two if there is a decent chance he could beat one marker), and mark all the nearby passing options. This means that the team will have less of a chance to make an interception, lowering their ability to quickly transition from winning to possession to attacking. However, it does allow them to challenge the receivers of the pass, allowing them to utilize their physicality and tackling ability to stifle their opponent and win the ball.

Now with all these systems of counter-pressing, there has to be an understanding of how to play with the ball to set-up the counter-press. Essentially, a team that wants to counter-press must build their playing style around it. If the team plays with a very wide shape in attack, it is difficult to counter-press as the players have to travel long distances to either attack the ball-carrier, close down dribbling lanes, close down passing lanes, or mark passing options. Ultimately, the team’s shape in possession must compliment a counter pressing philosophy so that when possession is lost, the players are already in good possession to win it back. This takes a lot of time and training to get right. However, if Arsenal want to get to the next level, especially with this 4-1-4-1 formation, they need to figure out how they will look to attack the opposition immediately after possession is lost. Hopefully, we will see signs of this transformation at Villa Park.

A Ricardian Explanation for Playing Mesut Ozil from Out Wide

To be clear, this is not a statement of agreement with the use of Mesut Ozil from out wide, just an explanation. But first, we have to go back to the work of David Ricardo. As Arsenal Letters pointed out in the comments section of the Manchester City preview, I gave a oversimplified look at David Ricardo’s views on specialization. His greatest insight was not that we should specialize and trade, but how to determine who should specialize. What Ricardo determined, which may seem counter-intuitive, is that the person who should specialize in a task does not necessarily have to be the person who is the best at the task, but it should be the person who can operate in the role at the least cost, particularly the least opportunity cost³.

For example, let’s say it takes Tim 20 hours to make a jar of honey and 8 hours to make a jar of peanut butter, and it takes Naveen 100 hours to make a jar of honey and 10 hours to make a jar of peanut butter. Tim is much better than me making both honey and peanut butter. In fact, looking at all the things produced by the producers, Tim absolutely kills at making peanut butter. Assuming we create the same product and the products are of equal value, how should we specialize to produce the most value? We could have Tim make peanut butter and Naveen make honey. In 100 hours, Tim makes 12.5 jars of peanut butter and Naveen makes 1 jar of honey, for a total of 13.5 units of stuff. However, we can do better. If Tim produces honey instead of peanut butter, the cost is 7.5 jars of stuff/100 hrs (can produce 5 jars of honey at an opportunity cost of 12.5 jars of peanut butter). If Naveen produces honey instead of peanut butter, the cost is 9 jars of stuff/100 hrs (can produce one jar of honey at the cost of 10 jars of peanut butter. Therefore, we should have Naveen produce peanut butter and Tim produce honey, even though Tim’s peanut butter producing ability is better than any producer’s ability to produce any good, in this two-producer/two-good world. In this scenario, Tim produces 5 jars of honey and Naveen produces 10 jars of peanut butter, for a total of 15 jars of stuff, an increase in productivity of 1.5 jars. So by looking to minimize opportunity cost, instead of allocating Tim to do what he is best at, we have produced more with our scarce resources.

If Arsene Wenger has a desire to play Wilshere, Ramsey, and Ozil together in a 4-1-4-1, then one can argue that the decision to play Ozil from out wide speaks more to Wenger’s faith in Ozil out wide or his lack of faith in Wilshere or Ramsey to play from wide. It does not have to do with the absolute ability of Ozil in the center of the pitch, who is the superior option in an advanced central role of the three. It has to do with the drop off between Ozil central/Ozil wide being smaller than the drop off between Wilshere central/Wilshere wide and Ramsey central/Ramsey wide, creating the perception that Ozil should be the one “sacrificed” to get these players on the pitch at the same time. This goes with Ozil’s greatest ability, to operate as an attacking balancer, someone whose movement and positioning helps to create space for other players, a role that no one on this Arsenal team plays well (you will not see him stay wide in a match; he moves into whatever space he can to exploit it or create space elsewhere for others). So, if Wenger is going to play Wilshere and Ramsey, who like to operate in similar spaces, about 20-40 meters from goal, along with Welbeck and Sanchez, who like to drop into similar spaces from time to time, he needs a player like Ozil who can refrain from parking himself in the center of the pitch, and looks to do what is best for the attacking shape4.

Once again, this is not an endorsement of playing Ozil out wide, playing a 4-1-4-1, or trying to squeeze Ramsey, Ozil, and Wilshere onto the same pitch with forwards who come short, in addition to going long. It is not even an endorsement of the idea that the drop-off between Ozil central/Ozil wide being smaller than the drop off between Wilshere central/Wilshere wide and Ramsey central/Ramsey wide. It is just a possible explanation as to why Wenger has opted for this path.

Follow Naveen on twitter @njm1211

¹They scored on a set-piece where Liverpool man-marked about as poorly as one can man mark…more often than not, set-piece defense comes down to execution and not the system.
²like Daniel Baier…a player Arsenal should probably consider as a short-term holding midfielder option
³for a really good explanation of Ricardo’s insights and a look at specialization you can listen to, go here
4a player like Cesc Fabregas in this set-up would add to the issue of too many players looking to play in the same space in an attempt to impose his on-the-ball ability on the match